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ON THE RELIABILITY OF MORAL AND INTELLECUTAL VIRTUES 
Jason Baehr 
Loyola Marymount University 
 My concern here is with what we might call the logic of a virtue, that is, with the 
essential or defining features of a virtue. Therefore in contrast with, say, Aristotle’s 
inquiry into virtue, I am not necessarily concerned with qualities that virtuous people as 
we known them tend to possess, but rather with qualities that any virtuous person must 
possess. Specifically, I am concerned with whether “reliability” – or the reliable 
achievement of the ends or goals proper to a virtue – is an essential or defining feature of 
a virtue.  
By a “virtue” I mean an excellence of personal character. And my interest lies 
with both moral and intellectual virtues. Moral virtues, as I am thinking of them, are 
excellences of moral character that include traits like courage, generosity, honesty, and 
compassion. Intellectual virtues are excellences of intellectual character and are 
essentially the intellectual counterpart to the moral virtues. They include traits like 
intellectual courage, caution, perseverance, carefulness, thoroughness, openness, and 
fairness.1 I am interested, then, in whether it is a defining feature of moral and intellectual 
virtues that their possessor reliably achieve the ends or goals proper to each kind of 
virtue.  
There is considerable disagreement about this issue in both ethics and 
epistemology. One need not look far to find prominent figures in each field sitting on 
opposite sides of the fence. In ethics, for instance, Julia Driver (1996; cf. Bentham 1789) 
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claims that reliability is the defining feature of a moral virtue, while Michael Slote (1997; 
2001) argues that reliability is not essential. In epistemology, Linda Zagzebski (1996) 
argues that reliability is a necessary condition for an intellectual virtue, while James 
Montmarquet (1993; 2000; cf. Dancy 2000) denies this claim.  
I defend four main theses in connection with this issue. I argue (1) that reliability 
is not a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they often are) as 
“personal excellences” or as traits the possession of which make one a good or better 
person, but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue 
according to which reliability is a defining feature. I go on to argue (3) that even on the 
former conception, a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability is essential and (4) that 
reliability itself, while not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a 
concomitant of it. The discussion sheds important light on the nature of intellectual and 
moral virtues and on certain debates in epistemology and ethics.  
I 
Before getting to the main argument, I must draw attention to two additional 
features of moral and intellectual virtues as I shall be thinking of them. The first concerns 
the ends or goals proper to each. On the general conception of moral and intellectual 
virtues assumed here, an intellectually virtuous person is one who is motivated in a 
particular way by cognitive or intellectual ends like truth, understanding, and rationality. 
Such a person characteristically desires, aims at, cares about, takes pleasure in, etc., these 
values.2 By contrast, a morally virtuous person is ultimately motivated by certain 
distinctively moral ends. He cares about, pursues, delights in, etc., things like the 
promotion of justice, human flourishing, and the alleviation of suffering.3 We need not 
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worry here about trying to specify the complete set of values proper to each kind of 
virtue. The important point is that in asking about the reliability of these virtues we are 
asking about their reliability vis-à-vis values or goals of the sort just specified. 
Second, I shall be assuming (at least to begin with) a general conception of these 
traits according to which they are “personal excellences,” which again means that one is a 
better person or is better qua person on account of possessing them. While I cannot 
explore this notion in any detail here, I assume it is a familiar and intuitive way of 
thinking about the nature of a virtue. It has much in common, for instance, with accounts 
of virtue according to which virtues are admirable personal traits (e.g. Slote op. cit.) or 
constituents of human flourishing.4 The basic idea is that while certain traits of character 
may make one better qua, say, athlete, musician, carpenter, or attorney, others have a 
more direct bearing on one’s personal worth or excellence. One obviously can be an 
excellent musician or carpenter, for example, without being a particularly good person; 
conversely, one can be deeply compassionate, generous, or honest and yet be a failure in 
these other capacities. Virtues as I shall be thinking of them, then, are those traits of 
character the possession of which contribute to one’s personal worth or make one good or 
better qua person.5 As the example above illustrates, this conception of a virtue is clearly 
applicable to those traits that we typically regard as moral virtues. But it also applies to 
traits commonly regarded as intellectual virtues. A person who desires the truth for its 
own sake, who is committed to acquiring a genuine understanding of a range of important 
topics, and who, in pursuit of these ends, makes substantial sacrifices, remains open and 
honest to viewpoints that initially seem to conflict with his own, inquires in a patient, 
careful, and attentive way, clearly would seem a better person as a result. This is not to 
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say that this person would be morally better (though on a broad enough conception of 
morality this might be true as well), but there is little reason to think that the domain of 
personal excellence or worth must be limited to or exhausted by that of moral excellence 
or worth.6 
II 
Our concern, then, is with what I shall call the “reliability thesis.” This is the 
claim that reliability of the sort just noted is an essential or defining feature of moral and 
intellectual virtues.  
At first glance, there would appear to be a good deal of intuitive support for the 
reliability thesis, for under normal conditions we would more than balk at calling a 
person genuinely intellectually virtuous if, despite his best efforts, he never actually 
reached the truth, acquired knowledge or understanding, etc. Similarly, we would 
scarcely think of a person as genuinely benevolent if, good intentions notwithstanding, 
she regularly failed to promote the well-being of other people. Such individuals would 
likely strike us as incompetent rather than virtuous. Indeed, it might be wondered whether 
there is anything more to an ascription of virtue than a judgment that the person in 
question has a certain competence or is reliable at producing certain good outcomes.  
While I will return to some of these considerations below, it would be a mistake 
to give them too much initial weight in the present context, for they mainly concern what 
we would expect of virtuous people in our world or in worlds like ours. To be sure, a 
person who, under normal conditions, failed regularly to reach the truth or to affect the 
world in a morally good way could not be considered virtuous. It does not follow from 
this, however, that such reliability is an essential or defining feature of a virtue; for again, 
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the latter are qualities that any virtuous person must have, and it is at least questionable 
whether under nonstandard conditions, a person who failed in the ways just mentioned 
would also fail to be virtuous. 
Indeed my first argument against the reliability thesis exploits this possibility. The 
argument centers around the following two cases.   
Case 1: Imagine an epistemic agent, Tori, who inhabits a world controlled by an 
epistemically malevolent Cartesian demon. Tori has all the “internal” marks of an 
intellectually virtuous person: she desires the truth, is committed to achieving an 
understanding of important issues, is willing to make sacrifices so that she can 
achieve her epistemic goals, is tenacious and patient in inquiry, listens fairly and 
openly to others, evaluates evidence carefully and thoroughly, etc. By her lights 
and by the lights of everyone around her, Tori is extremely intellectually 
successful: she has, let us say, enjoyed a long and influential career as a genetic 
researcher producing excellent work that has advanced her field in important 
ways; she also reads voraciously, has an impressive sense of local and global 
history, geography, and politics, a sophisticated grasp of various complex issues 
in economics, medicine, ethics, etc., and is uniquely adept at making insightful 
connections between these various bodies of (apparent) knowledge. Appearances 
aside, however, Tori is radically deceived. Given the real nature of things, which 
the Cartesian demon keeps perfectly hidden, most of her supposed “knowledge” is 
riddled with falsehoods. 
From an intuitive standpoint,7 it seems clear that despite her overwhelming lack 
of cognitive success, Tori is genuinely intellectually virtuous: that she is, for instance, 
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genuinely intellectually tenacious, fair, patient, careful, reflective, etc. After all, she has 
all the right motives, intentions, feelings, etc., and does all she can to achieve her 
epistemic goals. Her failure to reach the truth is due entirely to her extraordinary and 
unfortunate circumstances – circumstances entirely beyond her control.8  
Case 2: Now consider Tori’s moral counterpart Ted, who is the victim of a 
morally wicked Cartesian demon. Upon returning from a recent, eye-opening trip 
to an impoverished third-world country, Ted has resigned as the CEO of a 
lucrative but soulless corporation to start a nonprofit organization aimed at 
improving the plight of various poor and oppressed people groups across the 
globe. Ted has done so, not out of guilt or any quasi-egoistic motivation, but 
because of a genuine, altruistic concern for the plight of the less fortunate, a 
concern which has come to occupy an entrenched and prominent place in his 
psychology. The demon, while not concealing the general nature of reality from 
Ted, nevertheless thwarts all of his moral efforts. Though Ted thinks that his 
fundraising is resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars of aid being sent 
around the world, the demon systematically stymies the transactions, funneling 
the cash into slush funds at Ted’s former corporation. While Ted continues to 
build the organization and to grow in his concern and compassion for the people 
whose lives he is working to improve, his efforts are almost entirely morally 
fruitless.  
Again, insofar as Ted’s moral outlook and sympathies are genuine, as long as he 
possesses the relevant motives and feelings and does what he can to achieve the relevant 
moral ends, it seems clear that he is genuinely morally virtuous. While his efforts 
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ultimately are thwarted (and indeed may be doing more harm than good), this is in no 
way his own doing or fault, and so would not appear to make him less than genuinely 
compassionate, benevolent, generous, and so forth.9  
While apparently providing good reason for thinking that reliability is not a 
defining feature of a virtue, these cases may carry little weight for someone already 
convinced of the reliability thesis. Such a person might claim, for instance, that because 
of the unfortunate outcomes of their efforts, Tori and Ted simply cannot be genuinely 
virtuous: Tori is not genuinely fair-minded or intellectually tenacious because she fails to 
consistently hit upon the truth and Ted is not genuinely compassionate and generous 
because he fails to actually improve the lives of those he is trying to help. While I will 
attempt later on to make some sense of this reply, for the moment I note simply that it 
comes at a high intuitive price. For again, from an intuitive standpoint, it is difficult to 
deny that Tori and Ted are genuinely virtuous even though they fail to accomplish their 
respective goals.  
There is, however, an alternative move open to a defender of the reliability thesis, 
one that does not require a denial of the claim that Ted and Tori are genuinely virtuous. 
Note that Ted and Tori have character traits that in other possible worlds or environments 
would lead to very good epistemic and moral outcomes. Indeed, they fail to do so in 
reality only because Ted and Tori inhabit extremely bizarre and nonstandard worlds. We 
may distinguish, then, between two types of reliability: viz., “categorical” reliability and 
“indexical” reliability. A trait is categorically reliable just in case it is reliable in any 
possible world or environment, while a trait is indexically reliable just in case its 
reliability is indexed or relative to a limited set of worlds or environments. Accordingly, a 
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defender of the reliability thesis could hold that moral and intellectual virtues are 
indexically (though not categorically) reliable and in doing so agree with the claim that 
Ted and Tori are virtuous. For again, they possess traits which in other possible worlds or 
environments would lead to certain good moral and intellectual outcomes.10 
But there is a fairly obvious problem with this objection: namely, that from an 
intuitive standpoint, Ted and Tori are virtuous in light of who they are and what they do 
in the very worlds they occupy, that is, in light who they are considered in its own right. 
It seems wrong to suggest that Ted and Tori are virtuous on account of what they might 
accomplish in certain other possible worlds (possible worlds very distant from their own). 
Rather, it is Tori’s very love of knowledge and her willingness to do what it takes to 
acquire it – her love and willingness taken by themselves or considered in their own right 
– that make Tori genuinely intellectually tenacious, careful, reflective, etc. An analogous 
point holds for Ted: he is morally virtuous on account of his compassionate outlook and 
generous heart themselves, not because of what, in certain other, nonactual worlds, might 
result from these traits.11 Another way to see the point is to recall that we are thinking of 
intellectual virtues as personal excellences. It seems plainly false to think that Tori or Ted 
is a better person – especially a better person here and now – on account of certain results 
they would produce were they to find themselves in radically different environments. 
Such counterfactual considerations seem irrelevant to their present personal worth.  
This leads to a second, more principled objection to the reliability thesis. Note 
again that the failure of Tori and Ted to accomplish their goals is no fault of their own; it 
is on account of terribly bad luck that their best efforts go awry. It would seem, however, 
that judgments about personal worth or excellence are largely immune to factors beyond 
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an agent’s control, that is, immune to the kind of epistemic and moral luck in question. It 
cannot reflect poorly on Ted (or on Ted as a person), say, that his good moral intentions 
and efforts are thwarted by a malevolent agent that he is entirely unaware of and can do 
nothing about. Ted might have a more desirable life were he not so unlucky (certainly 
others would), his actions might even be considerably more valuable (in fact, if act 
utilitarianism is true, this might be necessary for his actions to be considered morally 
right), but a morally friendlier world would not make Ted a better person. And of course 
an analogous point could be made regarding Tori: while she would enjoy greater 
intellectual success in an epistemically friendlier world, she would not thereby be an 
intellectually better person.12  
If in fact personal worth cannot be determined by factors susceptible to the 
relevant kind of epistemic and moral luck, then it would seem that reliability cannot be a 
defining feature of a virtue conceived as a personal excellence. For, as the cases of Ted 
and Tori illustrate, our actual success in our intellectual and moral endeavors is often, in a 
very deep way, a matter of luck. Whether our inquiries lead to the truth frequently 
depends on a number of factors beyond our control: for instance, that other people are 
telling us the truth, that “common knowledge” really can be trusted, that various received 
methods of acquiring information are reliable, and, of course, that appearances in general 
are not, as they are for Tori, radically misleading. Similarly for our moral efforts: success 
in this area requires, for instance, that the people we aim to help really do have the needs 
they appear to, that others bring to completion certain efforts that we initiate, and that our 
moral aims and efforts are not systematically thwarted in the way that Ted’s are. 
Reliability, then, is a deeply chancy phenomenon. But since virtues as we are conceiving 
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of them just are personal excellences, a person’s reliability or lack thereof cannot bear on 
whether she possesses a virtue, which is another way of saying that reliability is not an 
essential or defining feature of a virtue thus conceived.13  
In response, a defender of the reliability thesis might take issue with the general 
conception of a virtue underlying this argument. It might be said that a virtue is not 
identical to a personal excellence, but rather that the notion of a virtue incorporates both 
the notion of personal excellence and the notion of reliability. By this account, which we 
might refer to as a “mixed” conception of a virtue, virtues have a kind of dual nature. To 
say that a person is virtuous is to say that she is both good qua person in the relevant 
sense and that she possesses a certain competence, that is, that she can be counted on to 
achieve or is reliable with respect to the ends or goals proper to the virtue in question. By 
holding to a mixed conception, a defender of the reliability thesis can agree that 
reliability does not bear on personal worth in the manner indicated above while still 
maintaining that reliability is a defining feature of a virtue.14 
The first thing to note about a mixed conception of a virtue is that it attempts to 
bring together two very different sorts of values under a single, univocal conception of a 
virtue. Understood as personal excellences, virtues have their value “in themselves”; they 
are intrinsically valuable. The value of being good qua person is not, for instance, 
derivative from the value of the things such a person is likely to accomplish. Understood 
as competences or reliable dispositions, however, the value of virtues is instrumental; it is 
derivative from the value of the ends to which they are a reliable means. While this does 
not by itself constitute an objection to a mixed conception, it does raise the question of 
whether this conception is attempting to bring together what are actually two different 
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kinds of virtue under a single, univocal conception of a virtue. I will return to this point 
below.  
This initial worry aside, there is good reason to think that the requirements of a 
mixed conception are too strong. If reliability were in fact a defining feature of a virtue, 
then to assert that a person is virtuous would be to assert that he would, at least in certain 
environments, be successful at achieving certain valuable ends. But if this were the case, 
we could not reasonably make virtue ascriptions in the absence of a consideration of this 
kind of success or potential success. The problem is that we can make such ascriptions. 
As the cases of Tori and Ted indicate, it is possible to be justified in regarding a person as 
virtuous just on the basis of their virtuous motives, intentions, desires, etc., considered in 
their own right. It is not essential that we also consider the potential good that might 
result (and only in other possible worlds at that) from these qualities.  
Similarly, if a mixed conception of a virtue were correct, knowing that a 
particular person possesses a character trait which under certain conditions would lead to 
the achievement of certain valuable ends also would be an insufficient basis, when taken 
by itself, for regarding that person as virtuous. But this too seems counterintuitive. It 
seems reasonable, that is, to think that if we a know a person to have a trait of this sort, 
then quite apart from any consideration of the bearing the trait might have on this 
person’s worth qua person, we shall be warranted in regarding this person as virtuous, at 
least in some legitimate sense of the term. After all, we can talk sensibly about the virtues 
of, say, an athlete or musician or carpenter, and yet none of these traits would appear to 
have any immediate bearing on the personal worth or excellence of their possessor. This 
is attributable to the fact that in the broadest sense a virtue is simply an excellence, and 
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there is more than one way in which a character trait might be good or excellent. It might 
be good because it contributes to personal worth or excellence or it might be good (as in 
the case of the virtues of an athlete, musician, etc.) simply because of its favorable 
outcomes.  
This suggests a distinction between what we might call a “personal worth” 
conception of a virtue, according to which a virtue just is a personal excellence, and a 
“competence” conception, according to which a virtue is simply a competence or 
disposition to bring about certain valuable ends in a reliable way. Indeed, while not a 
widely recognized distinction, it is to some extent evident in the literature of both virtue 
epistemology and virtue ethics. Virtue epistemologists, for instance, are routinely divided 
into two main camps. “Virtue reliabilists” conceive of intellectual virtues (roughly) as 
any reliable quality of a person, while “virtue responsibilists” conceive of them as the 
traits of a responsible inquirer (Axtell op. cit.; Baehr op. cit.). While these groups 
regularly quibble over who has the “right” conception of an intellectual virtue (e.g. 
Zagzebski op. cit.; Greco 2002), a more plausible diagnosis is that neither group has a 
monopoly on the concept, that each is dealing with its own viable and legitimate general 
conception of an intellectual virtue (i.e., that virtue reliabilists are occupied with a 
competence conception and virtue responsibilists with a personal worth conception).15 A 
similar point can be made in connection with virtue ethics. As noted earlier, Julia Driver 
identifies reliability as the exclusive virtue-making property of a moral virtue, while 
Michael Slote analyzes this notion strictly in terms of certain admirable and intrinsically 
valuable motives. Both authors leave little room for the possibility that the other’s 
conception might also be correct.16 On the one hand, this is understandable, since the two 
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accounts of virtue are very different and might seem incompatible. But again, a more 
plausible diagnosis suggests itself: namely, that the authors in question are concerned 
with fundamentally different conceptions of a virtue (i.e., Driver with a competence 
conception and Slote with a personal worth conception), and hence that they are not so 
much engaged in substantive disagreement as they are talking about different kinds of 
moral virtue. 
The distinction in question also allows us to make sense of the related and 
(heretofore) seemingly hard-nosed reliabilist claim noted above to the effect that 
reliability must be a defining feature of a virtue, that indeed, it is the defining feature. We 
saw that commitment to this claim might lead one to hold, for instance, that Tori and Ted, 
on account of their utter failure to achieve their intellectual and moral goals, cannot 
possibly be genuinely virtuous. While false relative to a personal worth conception, this 
judgment is entailed by a competence conception (or at any rate by a competence 
conception according to which virtues are categorically reliable). Thus we again may 
hypothesize that those who find the initial claim convincing and consequently are 
resistant to the sort of intuitive argument offered above, are thinking in terms of a 
competence (rather than a personal worth) conception of a virtue. 
There are several good reasons, then, for distinguishing between what we have 
called a “personal worth” conception and a “competence” conception of a virtue. This 
distinction permits two additional conclusions worth noting. First, it reveals that a mixed 
conception of a virtue makes the mistake, alluded to earlier, of trying to wed two 
fundamentally different and logically independent conceptions of a virtue under a single, 
univocal conception. Accordingly, an appeal to a mixed conception cannot provide a way 
 14 
around the principled argument against reliability thesis discussed above. Second, the 
distinction between a personal worth conception and a mixed conception shows that 
while reliability is not a defining feature of a virtue qua personal excellence, it is a 
defining feature – indeed the defining feature – of an alternative conception of a virtue. 
Again it is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of a certain kind of virtue that 
one possess a competence of the relevant sort.   
3. 
In the remainder of the paper, I want to look in a little more detail at the role of 
reliability on a personal worth conception of a virtue. The discussion thus far might leave 
the impression that reliability is more or less irrelevant to such a conception since it 
might appear that all this conception requires for the possession of a virtue is the 
instantiation of certain admirable aims, motives, desires, etc.17 
But this impression is mistaken. We can begin to see why by considering an 
objection to the effect that the personal worth conception is too lenient. Imagine, for 
instance, a psychic or fortuneteller who has a genuine desire to reach the truth about the 
future and who pursues this goal carefully and diligently, but only via her crystal ball. 
Imagine also an avid sports fan who out of a sincere desire to please his children 
regularly takes them to various sporting events even though they show little interest or 
enjoyment in sports. Intuitively, neither of these characters is genuinely virtuous. And yet 
it might be thought that according to a personal worth conception they would be virtuous 
since they possess the good motives or desires essential to this conception.18 A solution 
would be to build the notion of reliability into the personal worth conception (thereby 
resulting in a mixed conception), since the means these individuals adopt in pursuit of 
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their virtuous goals seem clearly to be unreliable.19 We have seen, however, that such a 
requirement is too strong.  
Thus the personal worth conception of a virtue is faced with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, its requirements must be sufficiently strong so as not to deem virtuous the sorts 
of characters just noted. But on the other hand, its requirements must not be so strong as 
to make reliability a defining feature of a virtue. 
In considering how this challenge might be met, it will be helpful to have at our 
disposal a distinction between what we might call “virtue-relevant” (hereafter v-relevant) 
goals and v-relevant actions. V-relevant goals are the goals proper to intellectual and 
moral virtue. V-relevant actions are those that an agent performs in her attempt to 
accomplish her v-relevant goals. Thus the fortuneteller’s v-relevant goal is the truth and 
her v-relevant actions consist in her study of the crystal ball, while the sports fan’s v-
relevant goal is the happiness of his children and his v-relevant action that of taking them 
to various sporting events. 
Compare the characters just discussed with Tori and Ted discussed above. The 
two sets of characters have much in common: both are appropriately motivated by v-
relevant goals and yet both perform v-relevant actions that are largely unsuccessful at 
achieving these goals. Nevertheless Ted and Tori intuitively are virtuous while the 
fortuneteller and sports fan are not. So what is the difference? The difference would seem 
to concern the cognitive perspectives of the various characters in question.20 Tori and Ted 
have every reason to believe that their v-relevant actions are a perfectly good means to 
their v-relevant goals, for again, the demons controlling their worlds do seamless work, 
leaving no indication of any deception or trickery. The fortuneteller and sports fan, by 
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contrast, presumably lack good reason to believe that their v-relevant actions are an 
effective means to their v-relevant goals. Consequently they exhibit a kind of 
irrationality. And this irrationality, it seems, is inconsistent with the kind of personal 
value constitutive of virtue on a personal worth conception. 
This suggests that a personal worth conception can pass through the horns of the 
dilemma noted above by adopting a certain rationality constraint. It can hold that being 
virtuous, while in part a matter of possessing certain admirable motives, desires, 
intentions, etc., also involves the possession of a certain cognitive perspective on one’s v-
relevant actions. Specifically, it involves having good reason to think that one’s v-
relevant actions are likely (in the world in which one finds oneself) to be an effective 
means to one’s v-relevant goals, that is, that one’s v-relevant actions are reliable. 
There is, then, a closer connection than one might initially expect between the 
notion of reliability and a personal worth conception of a virtue. While it is not essential 
to the possession of a virtue thus conceived that one actually be reliable, it is essential 
that one have good reason to think one is reliable. 
One additional point is worth making relative to the role of reliability on a 
personal worth conception. Notice that while I have thus far been arguing that reliability 
is not an essential or defining feature of a virtue conceived as a personal excellence (i.e., 
that it is not part of what makes a trait a virtue), I have refrained from claiming that it is 
not a necessary feature. This has not been accidental. Indeed, as I turn now to explain, 
given certain aspects of some of the key psychological ingredients of a virtue, the traits in 
question are in fact necessarily indexically reliable. While this fact is not, for reasons 
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already discussed, part of what makes these traits personal excellences, it is nevertheless 
a necessary concomitant of them.  
The necessity in question is a function of two main aspects of the various 
intentions, motives, desires, etc., that comprise a virtue conceived as a personal 
excellence. The first of these is their intentional or goal-oriented nature. As we have seen, 
to possess a virtue is in part to be motivated by, to desire, to aim at, etc., certain valuable 
ends or goals. The second aspect is what we might refer to as their “robust” nature. It is 
clear that a person who, say, merely wishes to reach the truth or who merely daydreams 
about a more just society would fail to satisfy the motivational or intentional 
requirements of a virtue. The same could be said for one who has only a very weak desire 
to accomplish these ends. Indeed it is reasonable to think that in order to contribute 
logically to one’s personal worth or excellence in the relevant way, the qualities in 
question would need to be sufficiently robust such that, at least with respect to suitable 
environments or situations, they would be efficacious, in the sense that they would 
(perhaps together with certain related psychological qualities and some measure of luck) 
prove an effective means to the goal or end proper to the virtue in question. But this of 
course is just to say that when one instantiates the essential intentional ingredients of a 
virtue conceived as a personal excellence, necessarily one is indexically reliable.  
In this section we have reached two additional conclusions regarding reliability 
and virtue. We have seen that while reliability is not an essential or defining feature of a 
virtue conceived as a personal excellence, a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability 
is an essential feature. We have also seen that (indexical) reliability itself, though again 
not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a necessary feature.21 
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1 Thus I am thinking of intellectual virtues along “responsibilist” rather than “reliabilist” lines. Proponents 
of the latter conception tend to identify cognitive faculties and related abilities like vision, memory, 
introspection, and reason – rather than any character traits – as paradigm cases of intellectual virtue. See 
Axtell 1997 and Baehr 2006 for more on this distinction.  
2 Throughout the paper I shall be describing the relevant psychological dimension of both moral and 
intellectual virtues in this pluralistic and open-ended way. I do not want here to take a stand as to exactly 
what the relevant psychological requirements are, e.g., whether to possess a virtue a person must possess 
certain desires or intentions or pleasures or some combination thereof. I take it as given, however, that 
some such requirements exist. In employing this pluralistic characterization, then, I am simply making 
reference to those requirements, whatever exactly they turn out to be.  
3 Zagzebski (1996) draws a similar distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. She also makes the 
further (and to my mind less plausible) claims that intellectual virtues are a subset of moral virtues and that 
normative epistemology is a branch of ethics.  
4 The accounts of Aristotle (2000) and neo-Aristotelians like Rosalind Hursthouse (1998) are probably 
examples; however, it is not entirely clear whether either of these authors thinks of a virtue merely as a 
constituent of human flourishing, since on supportable readings of each, they think of virtues as both 
constituents of and a means to human flourishing. I will have more to say about such “mixed” or “hybrid” 
conceptions of virtue below.  
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5 This is not to deny that we can speak sensibly of the “virtues” (even character virtues) of an athlete, 
musician, carpenter, etc. In fact I defend this point below. 
6 My own account, which I cannot explain in any detail here, is that personal excellence or worth is a 
function of certain intentional relations between an agent and certain valuable (moral and intellectual) ends. 
To be good qua person is, for example, to love, care about, etc., certain moral values like justice or the 
alleviation of suffering, but also certain intellectual or cognitive values like knowledge and understanding. 
This explains how personal worth or excellence can have both a moral and an intellectual dimension. For a 
similar account, see Hurka 2001.   
7 By an “intuitive standpoint” I mean simply a (more or less) commonsense or theory-neutral standpoint, 
and more precisely, the standpoint of one who is not already committed to a substantive account of whether 
reliability is a defining feature of a virtue. It is of course critical to any rational adjudication between 
competing answers to our central question that such a standpoint exists and that we are (more or less) able 
to take it up.  
8 James Montmarquet (1993) and Casey Swank (2000) defend similar arguments against the reliability 
thesis.  
9 See Garcia 2003 for a similar line of reasoning.  
10 This kind of move is made by some virtue epistemologists in response to the so-called “new evil demon 
problem,” which concerns the epistemic status of the beliefs of a victim of a Cartesian demon. Intuitively, 
the person’s beliefs are justified, which in turn seems to pose a problem for thinking that justification is a 
function of reliable traits or intellectual virtues. In response, Sosa (1991) and others claim that justification 
is a function of traits that are reliable merely in an indexical (rather than the categorical) sense just noted.  
11 This is not to deny that it might also be reasonable to conclude that Ted and Tori are virtuous on the basis 
of their indexical reliability. Indeed, I defend such a point below. Rather, my claim here is that from the 
intuitive standpoint in question, the basis for this judgment is not the fact that they are indexically reliable 
but rather the very content of their psychology.  
12 As these comments suggest, I am denying the existence of only a certain, fairly narrow kind of moral and 
epistemic luck. I am claiming only that the extent to which one is good qua person in the relevant (moral or 
intellectual) sense is not a matter of a particular kind of luck. I do not deny that other kinds of normative 
status (e.g., the kinds noted above) can be a matter of luck. Nor do I deny that personal worth or excellence 
is a matter of luck in certain respects. It might depend, for instance, on the community in which one was 
raised or the kind of parenting one received. Thus I do not see any conflict between my argument and the 
claims regarding moral luck by authors like Bernard Williams (1981) and Thomas Nagel (1979).  
13 This holds even where reliability is understood indexically. For even when intellectual or moral virtues 
are exercised in “suitable environments,” this typically is not entirely sufficient for achieving the relevant 
goals; other factors also play a role and at least some of these factors (e.g., the effective assistance of 
others) are beyond the control of the agent in the relevant sense.  
14 Mixed conceptions can be either strong or weak depending on whether they construe reliability 
categorically or indexically. Zagzebski (1996) apparently defends a strong mixed conception with respect 
to both moral and intellectual virtues.  
15 The responsibilist conception and a personal worth conception may not be identical, but one natural and 
plausible way of analyzing the notion of personal excellence or worth is in terms of personal responsibility.  
16 Driver’s main objection to a personal worth conception, for example, is that one can be virtuous without 
possessing the sorts of motives or intentions that such a conception deems central to virtue. All that matters, 
she claims, is that the trait in question have good consequences (1996, pp. 116-22). But this of course is 
entirely consistent with the view that there are two kinds of virtue, one of which (viz. a “competence 
virtue”) is a matter of being reliable and does not strictly speaking require the relevant motives or desires, 
but the other of which does. Slote, on the other hand, analyzes the concept of a moral virtue in terms of 
certain admirable motives the value of which he says is intrinsic and not derivative from the good 
consequences to which they are likely to lead (2001, pp. 21-23). However, Slote does not (to my 
knowledge) acknowledge the possibility that this might be but one of (at least) two viable ways of thinking 
about the notion of a virtue, the other of which is centered on the notion of reliability.  
17 This resembles what Slote refers to as the charge of “autism and antinomianism” against (what is 
essentially) a personal worth conception of a virtue (2001, pp. 15-19). Slote’s response to the objection, 
however, is very different from the one developed here.  
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18 These cases may seem improbable on the grounds that if the psychic really had a desire to reach the 
truth, she would not bother consulting her crystal ball, or that if the father was genuinely concerned with his 
children’s happiness, he would not continue taking them to sporting events. My response is that while the 
cases are, for the reasons just indicated, unlikely, they nevertheless represent genuine possibilities, which is 
all that is required for the present point.  
19 This depends of course on how exactly we characterize the means or methods in question. And as the 
“generality problem” in epistemology shows (see Feldman and Conee 1998), this can be difficult. 
However, I take it there is a reasonably clear and relevant sense in which the methods in question are not 
reliable.   
20 The difference cannot be that Ted and Tori are indexically reliable while the other characters are not. For 
again, we saw above that intuitively Ted and Tori are virtuous not on account of what they might 
accomplish in other possible worlds, but on account of the content of their character considered in its own 
right. Moreover, it would be possible to modify the latter cases such that the actions in question clearly are 
weakly reliable, but where the characters who perform them are less than virtuous. Suppose, for instance, 
that the father regularly takes his children to parks and toy stores and libraries out of a desire to make them 
happy. Relative to many possible worlds (our own world included) his v-relevant actions are a reliable 
means to his v-relevant goal. We can imagine, however, that his kids are atypical and don’t enjoy any of 
these things. If they have given him no indication to the contrary, and indeed have repeatedly told their 
father that they dislike these activities, while his v-relevant actions would be indexically reliable, he still 
would not be virtuous.  
21 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 2006 Pacific Division Meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association and the 2005 Conference on Value Inquiry. I am grateful for helpful feedback 
received on both of these occasions. The paper also benefited from a 2005 Summer Research Grant from 
Loyola Marymount University.   
